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Freedom and equality have been the fundamental principles of
the American political tradition since the founding of the Republic.
Political liberty in the United States is based on the rights of individ-
uals to protection in the exercise of civil rights and to participation
in republican self-government under the principles of consent and
majority rule as expressed in the Declaration of Independence.
Equality as a constitutional concept likewise has been interpreted
with a bias toward individual freedom. American equality has meant
equal protection of the laws and equality of opportunity. It has
been premised on the removal of artificial and irrelevant restraints
on individuals, restraints such as legally defined class status or the
requirement of racial, religious, or ethnic qualifications for partici-
pation in public life.
Reflection on equality as a constitutional concept raises the
problem of defining the Constitution and ascertaining its meaning.
History and political philosophy provide two relevant approaches to
this problem. Accordingly, I will begin my consideration of consti-
tutional equality by examining the subject from an historical point
of view. This examination requires us to reflect on the nature and
intent of the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution. It also
leads us back further, to the founders' Constitution of the eight-
eenth century.
Justice Thurgood Marshall recently asserted that, although "the
Union survived the [C]ivil [W]ar, the Constitution did not."' Justice
Marshall's position is that the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth
amendments, embodying in his view "a new, more promising basis
for justice and equality," formed a new constitution.2 This asser-
tion, however, is historically inaccurate. The Constitution was not
abandoned or discarded during the Civil War, and the framers of
the Civil War Amendments did not make a new constitution. Rather
they confirmed, clarified, and extended the principles of liberty,
* Professor of History, University of Maryland College Park. A.B., Princeton,
1954; M.A., University of Washington, 1963; Ph.D., 1966.
1. T. Marshall, Remarks at the Annual Seminar of the San Francisco Patent and
Trademark Law Association in Maui, Hawaii 7 (May 6, 1987) (available at the .1arylnd
Law Review).
2. Id.
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equality, and consent embodied in the original Constitution. These
principles were imperfectly realized in American politics and gov-
ernment in the antebellum period, primarily because of the institu-
tion of slavery. The Civil War framers completed the Constitution
by abolishing slavery and extending the principle of the natural
rights of individuals to the entire Nation.
The concept of equal rights for individuals without racial dis-
tinction guided the authors of the Civil War Amendments. It was
expressed specifically in constitutional and statutory provisions for
legal and political equality.' American slavery had been racial slav-
ery; American freedom had therefore been racially qualified-as ac-
tually implemented, if not in principle. The purpose and intent of
the Civil War Amendments was to remove the racial stigma from
republican civil and political liberty. It was to make the freed slaves
American citizens and confer upon them the civil rights accorded all
citizens and not, as some have argued, a special right of Negro free-
dom and equality.4
The concept of equality that was written into the Constitution
by the founding fathers and the Civil War Amendments' framers is,
in the language of philosophy, "individual-regarding equality."5 It
means that in the organization of society there is only one class of
persons and that class shares the same civil liberties. A second type
of equality is described as "segmental equality,"6 referring to the
relationship of individuals within a subclass, such as the military.
Segmental equality is individual-regarding within the class. A third
type of equality, "bloc-regarding" or "group-regarding," insists on
equality between subclasses.7
Is constitutional equality merely a formal textual term, a con-
cept lacking fixed content that can be given any one or a combina-
tion of these three philosophical meanings? Is the "equal
protection of the laws" provided for in the fourteenth amendment
3. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (equal protection clause).
4. Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 387 (1967).
5. D. RAE, EQUALITIES 20-21 (1981). Individual-regarding equality is manifested in
the one person, one vote principle, which defines a class of equal citizens, granting each
the same formal right to vote as any other. Equal rights such as civil liberties of thought
and expression, rights against arbitrary arrest, and rights to property also fall under the
concept of individual-regarding equality.
6. Id. at 28-29. A segmental subject structure is defined by two features: (1) sub-
jects of equality are divided into two or more mutually exclusive subclasses and (2)
equality is required within, but not between, these subclasses.
7. Id. at 32. Bloc-equal structures are formally defined by two features: (I) the
subjects of equality are divided into two or more subclasses and (2) equality is required
between subclasses (blocs) and not within them.
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subject to redefinition according to the preferences of judges and
administrative agency rulemakers, the two types of government offi-
cials who have been most active in settling disputes about equality
and formulating civil rights policy in recent years? Under the theory
and practice of our constitutionalism, the answer is a firm and une-
quivocal "no." Yet on what basis can we say that the Constitution
embodies individual-rights equality? I believe the answer can be
found in history and political philosophy.
The history to which I refer concerns the founding of represen-
tative institutions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and
the making of republican constitutions in the Revolutionary era. In
the course of this historical experience Americans established equal
opportunity for individuals as a replacement for the feudal and aris-
tocratic idea that inherited or ascriptive status should determine the
nature and scope of a person's activity in politics and society. The.
principle of equal opportunity was subsequently extended against
distinctions and prejudices based on race, sex, ethnicity, and family
connections. The history of these events, including the abolition of
slavery and conferral of civil rights on the freed people by the four-
teenth amendment, reveals that the substance of the idea of equality
was the natural rights philosophy derived from Hobbes, Locke, and
other sources of modem liberalism, and expressed in the Declara-
tion of Independence.
Although the emancipation of slaves was the single most signifi-
cant civil rights advance in modern history, the attempt to secure
liberty and equal rights through the constitutional amendments8
and Civil Rights Acts of the Reconstruction9 was only partially suc-
cessful. Racial discrimination, much of it unlawful and unconstitu-
tional, persisted. The denial of black citizens' civil rights was
widespread and systematic, especially in Southern government and
politics. The Supreme Court decision in Plessy v. Ferguson'o con-
firmed and encouraged this behavior by legalizing state-sponsored
segregation under the philosophy of "separate but equal." At the
time of the decision people knew that separate facilities were not
equal, but in the opinion of both blacks and whites separate facilities
were better than no facilities at all. In other words, the separate but
equal rule seemed reasonable, and in the view of the Supreme Court
and American society this made it constitutional.
8. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XV.
9. Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1870, 1871, & 1875 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971-1972, 1981-1992 (1982)).
10. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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Plessy embodied a racial-group concept of equality. If it was a
valid interpretation of the fourteenth amendment, it superseded the
individual-rights idea as the substance of constitutional equality.
Notwithstanding the reasonableness it seemed to express in the
context of the late nineteenth century, was Plessy sound constitu-
tional law? For decades supporters of equal rights argued that it
was not. They sought to weaken and overthrow the separate but
equal rule and reverse the landmark segregation holding. The mod-
ern civil rights movement made this its principal objective, and suc-
cess finally came in the 1954 decision of Brown v. Board of
Education. " I
If the NAACP lawyers who argued Brown had prevailed in their
legal reasoning, the Supreme Court would have declared Plessy
wrongly decided, and held segregated schools unconstitutional on
the ground that the framers of the fourteenth amendment did not
intend for race to be regarded as a reasonable means of classifica-
tion in state legislation. The Court, however, did not decide Brown
on this basis. Instead, the Court concluded that in view of the im-
portance of education in modern American society, separate schools
were inherently unequal. The once reasonable separate but equal
rule had become unreasonable.
The Brown opinion did not explicitly subscribe to either the in-
dividual-rights or the group-regarding concept of equality. Never-
theless, most legal and political observers saw the decision as a
vindication of the principle of individual equal rights without racial
distinction. It gave a strong impetus to the civil rights movement,
which with the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 2 and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965"3 appeared to have gained full acceptance
for individual-rights equality in public policy. These statutes were
taken as clear expressions of individual equality as a constitutional
concept.
Few exercises of congressional legislative power seem as clear
as the provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 stating
that it shall be an unlawful employment practice to fail or refuse to
hire, or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual in the terms or conditions of employment be-
cause of the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national or-
11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 28
and 42 U.S.C. (1982)).
13. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973 to 1973bb-1 (1982)).
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gin.' 4 Within a few years, however, a group-defined theory of
equality was asserted by federal judges and Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission administrators as the standard of equality
contained both in the Civil Rights Act and in the Executive Order
prohibiting discrimination in federal contract work.' 5 The theory
and practice of affirmative action expressed the concept of bloc or
group equality.
Affirmative action started out in the early 1960s as an individ-
ual-rights method of promoting equal employment opportunity.
One means by which equal employment opportunity was effected
was by requiring government contractors to take positive steps to
change recruiting patterns and the environment in which employ-
ment decisions were made. Amidst the social upheaval of the mid-
1960s affirmative action quickly went beyond providing a remedy
for intentional acts of unlawful discrimination against individuals
because of race to become ajobs program for blacks. Proponents of
affirmative action sought to establish it as a policy that would permit
or require preferential hiring treatment for blacks as a group. The
purpose was to make blacks equal to whites by removing the effects
of past discrimination. Affirmative action judicial decisions and ad-
ministrative regulations shifted the focus of unlawful discrimination
from intentional injury or denial of rights based on race, to practices
in social institutions, such as businesses and schools, that had an
adverse or statistically disproportionate impact on blacks and other
minority groups. ' 6
In redefining discrimination, affirmative action decisionmakers
redefined the equality that is the subject of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and by implication the equality embodied in the
fourteenth amendment. Equality of opportunity, traditionally envi-
sioned as the removal of discriminatory barriers in order to give
blacks and other minorities access to jobs, training, and education,
gave way to equality of condition or result. It was argued that to
insist merely on individual-rights equality of opportunity was to pre-
serve inequality. In order to reach this conclusion proponents of
affirmative action denied that nondiscriminatory individual-rights
equality had been or could be effective in changing the socioeco-
nomic condition of blacks as a group. They argued that something
more was needed: compensatory discrimination that would address
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
15. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 168 (1964).
16. H. BELZ, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FROM KENNEDY TO REAGAN: REDEFINING AMERI-
CAN EQUALITY 9-17 (1984).
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the question of equality between racial groups, and would treat
blacks and whites as fungible social resources without regard to the
experience and attributes of individuals. The consequence has been
the establishment of race-conscious affirmative action, as seen in
court-ordered and government-induced "voluntary" public and pri-
vate quota policies in employment, education, and business.' 7
There were compelling political and social reasons for adopting
racially preferential policies in the mid-1960s. Chief among them
appear to have been the desire to give blacks jobs and a stake in
their communities in order to prevent further ghetto rioting and to
achieve a measure of social stability andjustice. A broader ideologi-
cal justification for affirmative action, at least in the view of its lead-
ing theorists, was historical: to secure atonement from white society
for the sins of slavery and racial discrimination.' 8 The institutional-
ization of affirmative action in the past twenty years has created
political and economic interests that demand perpetuation of race-
conscious preferment in the name of "civil rights."
The question is whether the justifications for affirmative action
transcend political expediency and assume the status of a constitu-
tional principle. Is affirmative action merely a temporary means of
achieving individual rights, as is implied in the frequent assertion
that in order to go beyond race it is necessary to take race into ac-
count? If so, does using race to go beyond race actually work as
intended? If it does not, are we to conclude that affirmative action
asserts a new principle of constitutional equality defined in racial-
group terms? Is this new principle perhaps the old principle of seg-
regation justified in the language of a new reasonableness?
It is pertinent to note that while there is much anecdotal evi-
dence regarding the actual effects of affirmative action, there has
been very little systematic social research on the subject. Scholars
have yet to survey the effects of affirmative action in a number of
important areas: confidence among its alleged beneficiaries; demor-
alization of those whom it has not protected; the economic costs of
enacting and implementing affirmative action regulations; and the
effects of preferential treatment policies in other societies.' "
The constitutional aspects of affirmative action are equally un-
settled. After several years of studious avoidance of the issue, the
Supreme Court recently handed down a series of decisions that up-
17. Id.
18. Id.




held affirmative action plans and remedies.2" The Court's actions
may be said to have confirmed the legality of affirmative action in a
positivistic sense, but it is not so clear that these decisions have es-
tablished the constitutional legitimacy of race-preference policies or
fixed racial-group equality as the controlling meaning of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court has in fact said very little about the Consti-
tution in its affirmative action decisions. In United States v. Paradise,2'
for example, Justice Brennan declared: "It is now well established
that government bodies, including courts, may constitutionally em-
ploy racial classifications essential to remedy unlawful treatment of
racial or ethnic groups subject to discrimination." Justice Brennan
offered no constitutional opinion, however-no reasoning from
text, original intent, history, or even moral philosophy-to explain
how the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment per-
mits race-conscious relief. He merely cited another affirmative ac-
tion decision, Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC,22 to support his
opinion. But Sheet Metal Workers contains nothing about the four-
teenth amendment. To some extent the Court has recognized that
the task of constitutional analysis of affirmative action has barely be-
gun. In both Sheet Metal Workers and Paradise Justice Brennan admit-
ted that although the Court has held that governmental racial
classifications for remedial purposes require a level of judicial scru-
tiny more demanding than the rational basis test, there is no con-
sensus on the appropriate constitutional analysis to be employed.2"
Prompted by Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County 2" the Court alluded to the
Constitution in relation to affirmative action. Justice Scalia stated
that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was not intended to
place a lesser restraint on discrimination by public officials than the
20. See Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986); United
States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa
Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987).
21. 107 S. Ct. 1053, 1064 (1987).
22. 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986).
23. See Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1064 ("But although this Court has consistently held
that some elevated level of scrutiny is required when a racial or ethnic distinction is
made for remedial purposes, it has yet to reach a consensus on the appropriate constitu-
tional analysis."). In determining whether race-conscious remedies are appropriate, the
Court looked to "the necessity for relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies, the
flexibility and duration of the relief, including the availability of waiver provisions; the
relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and the impact of the
relief on the rights of third parties." 107 S. Ct. at 1067.
24. 107 S. Ct. at 1064.
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Constitution allows. 25 In other words, according to Justice Scalia,
the protection of individuals against racial discrimination in Title
VII expresses or implements the principle of individual equal rights
embodied in the fourteenth amendment.26 In the majority opinion
Justice Brennan denied this proposition. Observing that Title VII is
based on the commerce power, he reasoned that the equal opportu-
nity provisions of the Civil Rights Act were not intended to incorpo-
rate the commands of the fourteenth amendment. 27 Furthermore,
Justice Brennan added, the requirement that a public employer
must also satisfy the Constitution does not mean that the Title VII
statutory prohibition was not intended to extend as far as the Con-
stitution.28 Justice Brennan seemed to say that under the commerce
power government officials carrying out affirmative action policy can
treat individuals in ways that might be prohibited by the fourteenth
amendment. In any event, the relationship between Title VII and
the Constitution requires clarification.
Although the Supreme Court has asserted the constitutionality
of remedial racial classifications, it has also struck down racial quota
policies on constitutional grounds. In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Edu-
cation 29 the Court held that layoffs of white employees in accordance
with an affirmative action plan violated the equal protection clause.
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 30 the Court struck
down a medical school racial quota for admission as contrary to the
fourteenth amendment. And in Washington v. Davis 3 the Court de-
cided that the unlawful discrimination prohibited by the fourteenth
amendment was intentional discrimination, rather than statistically
derived institutional discrimination. The anti-quota decisions of the
Supreme Court, however, are no more satisfactory or illuminating
than the decisions favoring quotas in providing analysis of affirma-
tive action in relation to the constitutional concept of equality.
The Supreme Court's failure to come to grips with affirmative
action as a question of constitutional equality reflects the lack of le-
25. See id. at 1472 (Scalia,J., dissenting) ("[I]t would be strange to construe Title VII
to permit discrimination by public actors that the Constitution forbids.").
26. See id. at 1469.
27. See id. at 1472.
28. See id. at 1450.
29. 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
30. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
31. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Court held that while it is true that the due process
clause of the fifth amendment prohibits the United States from invidiously discriminat-
ing between individuals or groups, it does not follow that a law or official act is unconsti-
tutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact. Id. at 239.
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gitimacy of racial preference in American society. Despite years of
government efforts aimed at gaining acceptance for compensatory
discrimination, affirmative action lacks legitimacy because it rejects
the concept of individual equality that most people believe is basic
to the American political tradition. In addition, racially preferential
policies fail to secure the approval of public opinion because they
have been created almost exclusively by judges and bureaucrats cir-
cumventing the procedures of democratic policymaking. The ille-
gitimacy of racial preference is not surprising when one considers
the statements of its leading theoreticians, who have increasingly
distanced themselves from the mainstream values of ordinary Amer-
icans. For example, Professor Derrick Bell writes: "Our task is no
longer the comparatively straightforward one of securing for all re-
gardless of race, color, and creed, those rights protected by the
Constitution."3 2 Rather, the task of the civil rights movement, de-
clares Professor Bell, is to end class-based "economic exploita-
tion." '33 In the view of another proponent of affirmative action, the
goal of civil rights reformers is to eradicate racism by overcoming
the predilection of Americans for incremental change through pop-
ular control, imposing substantial social and economic change by
authoritative elites.3 4 These and other arguments from the propo-
nents of affirmative action come close to repudiating the substantive
and procedural values of constitutional democracy.
For many years supporters of affirmative action defended it as a
temporary expedient needed to eliminate unlawful racial discrimina-
tion and achieve individual equal rights. Increasingly, however, af-
firmative action is seen as embodying a new principle of social and
political organization: racial-group proportionalism. Under this
principle it is the under-representation of designated racial and eth-
nic groups that becomes unlawful discrimination. Equality becomes
proportional racial representation, on the theory that in the absence
of discrimination all racial groups will be represented in all aspects
of society in proportion to their percentage of the population.
Although this idea has gained recognition in affirmative action judi-
cial opinions and administrative regulations, studies of perceptions
of discrimination show that the experience of most citizens confutes
it.35
32. Bell, The Dilemma of the Responsible Law Reform Lawyer in the Post-Free-Enterprise Era,
4 LAW AND INEQUALITY 231, 235 (1986).
33. Id. at 243.
34. SeeJ. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA (1984).
35. See Beer, The Wages of Discrimination, PUB. OPINION, July-Aug. 1987, at 17-19.
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Equal opportunity for individuals without distinction of race,
religion, gender, or national origin is one of the bedrock principles
of our polity. It is, as Douglas Rae wrote in his study Equalities, "the
most distinctive and compelling element in our national ideol-
ogy.'36 Furthermore, because of its importance to the definition of
American nationality, equality of opportunity is written into our fun-
damental law. It is what we mean when we refer to equality as a
constitutional concept.
36. D. RAE, supra note 6, at 61.
